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ABSTRACT 
The Six Day War of June 1967 was a pivotal point in the history of the 
Middle East and the world. For the United States, the war created a new political 
situation that brought about a marked shift in the direction of its foreign policy 
with the region. Using an in-depth study of primary and secondary sources, 
including Presidential documents from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, this 
study explores the new political situation that emerged from the war and 
examines the reaction of the Johnson administration to this new reality. 
Following the war, the Johnson administration sought to bring a new era of 
peace to the region. The President expressed this desire in a speech given on 
June 19, 1967 that delineated Five Great Principles of Peace that were 
necessary to end the violence in the region. Despite the clear wisdom of the 
Principles, the Johnson administration was unable to adjust to the new political 
situation. The resulting history is a story of missed opportunities, and this study 
focuses on the key failures of the administration in developing a new foreign 
policy stance: an inability to apply effective pressure on the victors that would 
open the door to real, meaningful negotiations; an unwillingness to take an active 
role in promoting communications with those defeated in the conflict; a lack of 
conviction or any concerted effort towards developing a real policy to limit a 













renewed arms race in the region; and a refusal to listen to the real victims of the 
cycle of war in the Middle East. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 5, 1967, over 200 aircraft of the Israeli Air force (IAF) attacked 
Egyptian forces occupying the Sinai Peninsula and airbases in Egypt. Within a 
week the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had occupied the entire peninsula from the 
Straits of Tiran to the Suez Canal, the West Bank of the Jordan including East 
Jerusalem and the Old City, the Gaza Strip, and most of the Golan Heights, 
physically reshaping the Middle East in a way that would affect the region and 
the world for the next thirty years. But the change was not merely territorial; the 
political situation had been greatly altered as well. 
Despite the devastation and heightened regional tension, the Johnson 
administration hoped the new situation might open the door for a new era of 
peace in the area based on strong peace agreements. To accomplish this goal, 
the President and his advisors developed the Five Great Principles of Peace that 
were necessary to end the cycle of violence and enable the peoples of the 
Middle East to live together in relative harmony. 
The President announced the Principles during a speech to the Foreign 
Policy Conference for Educators at the State Department on June 19, 1967. 
Johnson explained that in order to achieve peace, all nations of the Middle East 
must agree to these five principles: the right to life of all nations of the region, 
















the arms race In the Middle East, and respect for the political independence and 
territorial integrity of all nations.1 These tenets would be the basic guidelines by 
which the United States would negotiate as the United Nations Security Council 
worked to find agreement on a resolution to deal with the crisis. That resolution 
(United Nations Resolution 242) was passed in the Security Council on 
November 22, 1967, and would serve (at least in its rhetoric) as the foundation of 
the United States' foreign policy towards the Middle East for the next thirty years. 
Clearly, the Principles were an ambitious and worthy framework from 
which to hope for peace; however, the subsequent decades of tension and 
violence are, sadly, testaments to their failure. This ineffectiveness was 
established in their drafting and rested on the political situation that emerged 
from the Six Day War and the beliefs and conceptions that developed within the 
administration due to this new political reality. The Johnson administration had 
failed to provide the Israelis with public or private assurances that they would 
honor their previous commitments, and those of previous administrations, to 
Israel's security and continued existence, in spite of growing public and 
congressional support for the small nation. The overwhelming Israeli victory 
saved the administration from a political disaster that could have developed had 
the crisis or the war dragged on and rapidly completed a shift in United States' 
Middle East relations that had seen a gradual rise in the importance of Israel to 
the United States' interests in the area. Following the Six Day War, the small 
Jewish state quickly became the United States' primary ally in the region. 
1
 Presidential Remarks: Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, 6/19/67, Statement Box 241, LBJ 
Library. 
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This new situation hung over the administration as it attempted to 
formulate a new policy that would lead to peace. Johnson was unable and 
unwilling to apply adequate pressure to the newly significant Israelis that could 
have improved the conditions for peace; instead the administration's policy 
virtually mirrored the Israelis'. In addition, Israel's growing importance helped 
prevent the administration from making a concerted effort to open important lines 
of communication with many of the Arab states involved, making it virtually 
impossible for the White House to understand the humiliation and anger felt by 
the Arabs, resulting in a decidedly pro-Israeli stance that would be reflected in 
the United States' dealings with the region and would help more radical regimes 
paint the United States as a Zionist devotee that sought to impose its imperial 
aspirations upon the Arab people. 
The new political situation further prevented the United States from 
adequately pursuing what was arguably the most important principle set forth by 
the administration: limiting the Middle East arms race. Johnson and his advisors 
recognized that as the most important ally in the region, Israel would need 
extensive military aid to protect itself and the interests of the United States. 
Thus, the administration took the easy road and promoted a policy that amounted 
to mere political lip-service and even if it had been accepted by the other major 
players in the arms trade, would have done very little to limit the sale of weapons 
to the region. 
Perhaps the saddest aspect of the new political circumstance was the 
administration's refusal to listen to those most affected by the situation on the 
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ground, the Arabs of Palestine themselves. Due to the perceived political 
importance of those moderate Arab nations that were still willing to talk to the 
United States and the uninformed preconceptions of the political worthiness of 
Palestinian organizations, the key players in the administration felt it was more 
important and presented a better chance of success to deal with established 
nations. This failure to listen to those most affected was a missed opportunity 
that could have undercut the entire Arab world's belligerency towards Israel and 
led to the kind of peace Lyndon Baines Johnson desired. 
This study will scrutinize the new political situation of the United States 
following the Six Day War and will examine the effect it had on the development 
of United States foreign policy as expressed in the Five Great Principles of 
Peace as announced on June 19, 1967. Unfortunately, it is an account of missed 
opportunities and will focus on the key failures of the administration in developing 
the new foreign policy stance: an inability to apply effective pressure on the 
victors that would open the door to real, meaningful negotiations; an 
unwillingness to take an active role in promoting communications with those 
defeated in the conflict; a lack of conviction or any concerted effort towards 
developing a real policy to limit a renewed arms race in the region; and a refusal 
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THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE SUEZ CRISIS 
Animosity between the Jewish, Muslim and Christian Arabs was 
essentially a twentieth-century development, although there were periods of 
tension dating back to the earliest days of Islam. After Muhammad migrated to 
Medina in 622CE, several of the Jewish tribes around the city resisted his 
teachings and were subdued by force, including one tribe, the Qurayza, which 
witnessed the brutal beheading of its men and the enslavement of its women.2 
The following centuries in the Middle East were marked by the expansion of 
Islam as the dominant political and religious force of the region. However, Jews 
generally flourished in Islamic society, holding significant positions in such varied 
fields as politics and the arts. Indeed the Islamic Middle Ages have often been 
called a "'golden era'" for Jews in the Middle East.3 
The rapid expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century and 
the expulsion of both Jews and Muslims from the Iberian peninsula brought both 
the Arabs and the Jews under the control of the Sultan. For the predominately 
Muslim Arabs, life generally improved. Initially, the Jews of the region saw their 
position deteriorate; they were not granted full citizenship in the Empire, but were 
2
 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 9. 
3
 Ibid., 8. 
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generally tolerated and in many places had a high degree of autonomy.4 These 
long periods of relative tolerance were shattered by periods of extreme violence, 
but these occurrences were infrequent, and if compared to the Jews in Christian 
Europe during the same period, the Jews of the Middle East were in a much 
better position.5 
The influence of Western political thought and ideology made the 
nineteenth century one of marked improvement for the plight of Jews in Ottoman 
lands. A decree called the Hatt-i Humayun, issued by the Sublime Porte in 1856, 
brought equality in policy, if not in actuality, to all peoples of the Empire, 
regardless of religion. Although their position improved, they remained second-
class citizens of the Empire until its fall in 1918.6 
With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, control of the Middle East 
shifted to the various European victors. Under the Sykes-Picot agreement of 
1916, the French would receive either direct control or influence over south­
eastern Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Northern Iraq, and much of Northern Palestine. 
The British would be in charge of (again through either direct control or influence) 
over the Trans-Jordan region, including southern Palestine. The Allies planned 
to establish condominium control around Jerusalem and the Holy Lands that 
included both the British and French and would later add the Italians (with the 
signing of the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne in 1917.)7 
4
 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 2 n d ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000),49-
51. 
5
 Morris, Righteous Victims, 10. 
6
 Ibid., 13 
7
 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, 2 n d ed. (New York: Alfred 
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This multifaceted control would not last long. During the closing stages of 
the war the British improved their military position in the region as the French 
continued to handle the brunt of the fighting in Europe. Additionally, direct 
political control of Palestine was becoming increasingly more important to British 
leaders who saw the area as a buffer to their holdings in Egypt. The Balfour 
Declaration, issued by Britain in 1917 in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild, 
the president of the British Zionist Federation, declared the British government's 
desire to see the "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people" and declared that they would "use their best endeavors to facilitate the 
achievement of this objective."8 In making this statement, the British had 
declared their intention to bring Palestine firmly under the control of the crown 
and established their position as the primary supporter of the growing Jewish 
Zionist movement. 
Modern Zionism (a term established by Nathan Birnbaum in 18859) was 
seen by some Jews, principally the largely unassimilated Jews of eastern 
Europe, as the answer to their long-held status as second-class citizens 
throughout the world. It sought to promote Jewish political viability in eretz Israel 
through a policy of immigration. By increasing the number of Jews in the region, 
the community would gain increasing political importance and would eventually 
bring about the establishment of a Jewish State. This general guideline for the 
eventual establishment of a Jewish nation was expressed by Theodore Herzl in 
his book The Jewish State, published in 1896, although it did not establish 
8
 Ibid., 109. 
9
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9 l : Israel an  the Ar World ( e  York: . . Norton & Company, 2001), 1. 
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Palestine as the target of this effort. The First Zionist Congress, held in 1897, 
accepted Herzl's vision of political Zionism and gave it a focus: the obvious 
choice for the future Jewish State was Palestine.10 From this moment on, the 
focus of Zionists and their supporters was to try to increase their political 
influence in the region. This largely entailed trying to gain political support for the 
movement from a major power, primarily the Ottomans, during this early stage.11 
In their desire to return to the lands of their fathers, the Zionists 
overlooked a crucial difficulty, namely that the land they had set their sights upon 
was occupied by a large number of Arabs. This fact was not lost upon the early 
leaders of Zionism, but they certainly underestimated the opposition they would 
encounter from the local population. Few of the leaders of the movement had 
actually spent much time in the region, and most naively believed that the 
economic benefits the influx of European Jews would bring to the region would 
placate Arab opposition.12 
With the Balfour Declaration, the Zionists believed they had found their 
Great Power supporter and immigration into the region increased. However, the 
statement had an unforeseen consequence; it gave focus to the Palestinian 
Arabs' own desire for an independent homeland, giving purpose to a Palestinian 
nationalist movement opposed to not only the colonial aspirations of the British 
but also to the Zionists' expressed desire to establish a strong Jewish entity 
within their midst. These two conflicting desires made Britain's hold on Palestine 
during the mandate (1920-1948) increasingly tenuous. Rising Arab opposition, 
1 0
 Ibid., 3. 
1 1
 Morris, Righteous Victims, 23. 
1 2
 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 5. 
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expressed in violent protests, caused the British to rethink their somewhat 
misleading commitment to a Jewish homeland. With White Papers issued in 
1922, then again in 1939, the British showed their weakening support for the 
Balfour Declaration, attempting to limit the number of Jewish immigrants allowed 
into British mandated Palestine, eliminated large areas of Palestine from 
inclusion, and changed the political process to favor the Arabs who still held the 
majority.13 British backtracking angered the Zionist leaders, but they saw their 
best chance of attaining their dream lay in supporting the Allies as World War 
Two erupted. David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive,14 
declared that Zionists would "'fight the White Paper [of 1939] as if there were no 
war and to fight the war as if there were no White Paper,'"15 and thousands of 
Palestinian Jews volunteered to serve the Allied cause. Conversely, many Arab 
leaders believed that their best chance to end the period of European colonialism 
and the Jewish desire to claim their lands would be to support the Nazis, who 
had expressed a desire to grant independence to the Arab lands if they came to 
be in a position to do so.1 6 
The defining event for Jews and Arabs alike during World War Two was 
the Holocaust. As the extent of the atrocities became known in the West, public 
support for the Zionist call for a Jewish homeland increased, particularly among 
Jews in the United States who, prior to this realization, had been lukewarm to the 
idea. In 1942 a meeting of United States Zionists established a set of 
1 3
 Ibid., 10. 
1 4
 Ibid., 22. 
1 5
 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 2003), 3. 
1 6
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resolutions, deemed the Biltmore Program, supporting the settlement of Jews in 
Palestine and the eventual establishment of a Jewish state in the region. The 
United States Government was broadly supportive of the measure, and with the 
succession of Harry Truman to the presidency following the death of President 
Roosevelt in April 1945, the Zionist cause gained one of its most important 
supporters. Truman publicly supported the Biltmore Program throughout his 
presidency, based largely on humanitarian concerns, although the growing 
influence of the Zionist cause in Democratic politics was not lost upon the 
President either.17 
Following the war, it quickly became evident that Britain would be unable 
to maintain the whole of its world wide empire. The war effort had exerted 
extreme pressure on the British economy and the process of rebuilding called for 
a focus on domestic concerns. Additionally, intense pressure came from the 
White House for an end to colonialism and the promotion of the cause of self 
determination for all peoples. This pressure was particularly strong concerning 
Mandatory Palestine given Truman's public support of the Zionist cause. 
Faced with Britain's stated intention to withdraw, the United Nations 
created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and, based on its 
recommendations, the General Assembly approved Resolution 181 on 
November 29, 1947, which called for a two-state solution with an international 
regime to govern Jerusalem.1 8 Support for the measure was surprisingly strong, 
with thirty-three votes in favor (including the two super powers), thirteen against 
1 7
 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 254. 
1 8
 Oren, Six Days of War, 4. 
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with ten abstentions.19 The Jewish representatives accepted the resolution, but 
the Arabs rejected it, calling for an Arab state encompassing Palestine in its 
entirety. 
Arab response to the resolution was immediate and violent. Palestinian 
guerrilla groups attacked Jewish settlements throughout the region and 
established road blocks to hinder Jewish movement and communication. 
Fearing a United Nations backlash if the violence escalated, Jewish leaders 
concentrated on securing their position, which did include a directed effort to 
force Arabs out of Jewish dominated regions. However, as the end of the British 
Mandate approached (it was due to expire on May 15, 1948), Jewish forces took 
the offensive and reopened the roadways. The overwhelming Jewish success 
and rampant rumors of murderous atrocities (not wholly unfounded) against the 
Arab population drove a flood of Palestinian Arabs into neighboring Arab states. 
With estimates as high as 750,000 Arab refugees fleeing their homes, this 
created a humanitarian nightmare not only for the people in exile but also for the 
Arab states that had to find some way to feed and shelter these people. 
Additionally, as a catalyst for derision and discontent, the refugee problem would 
plague the region for the rest of the century.20 
At midnight on May 14, 1948, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion declared 
the establishment of the State of Israel; both superpowers accepted and 
recognized the new state almost immediately.21 Determined to prevent what they 
saw as overt injustice toward their fellow Arabs, the ill-equipped and essentially 
1 9
 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 257. 
2 0
 Oren, Six Days of War, 4. 
2 1
 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 259. 
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uncoordinated armies of Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon invaded 
the fledgling state the next day. The initial onslaught put Israel on the defensive. 
However, inter-Arab rivalries and quarreling combined with the clear superiority 
of the Jewish forces who had gained valuable experience on the battlefields of 
World War Two turned the tide of the battle in favor of the Israelis.22 To make 
matters worse for the Arabs, the Israelis held a numerical advantage from the 
start; during the initial Arab attack, the combined Arab forces consisted of some 
25,000 troops attacking a Jewish force of around 35.000.23 As the war 
progressed, the Israelis used breaks in the fighting to improve this advantage. 
By early 1949, the war was over; the Israelis had not only been able to defend 
their infant state, but had also been able to expand their territory by 30% over 
what Resolution 181 had granted them.2 4 The Armistice Agreements that 
brought the first Arab-Israeli war to an end were not a peace accord. They 
established temporary borders based on the military situation on the ground, 
dividing Palestine amongst Egypt (which maintained control of the Gaza Strip), 
Trans-Jordan (which held the West Bank, and would, within two years, annex the 
territory), and Israel. Additionally, they allowed the Arab states to maintain their 
belligerent stance toward Israel. The impermanent nature of the agreements laid 
the foundation for continuous outbreaks of violence between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, who had been greatly shamed by the outcome of the war. 
During the 1950s, the United States under President Eisenhower 
established a relatively balanced approach toward the Middle East that would 
2 2
 Ibid., 261. 
2 3
 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 35. 
2 4
 Oren, Six Days of War, 6. 
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Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1999), 97. 
2 6
 Oren, Six Days of War, 10. 
dominate U.S. relations with the region until 1967. Eisenhower believed that the 
best way to bring about reconciliation between the Arabs and the Israelis was to 
treat them both equally. A 1956 diary entry by the President proclaimed, "To 
take sides, could do nothing but to destroy our influence."25 The primary concern 
of the Eisenhower administration was to limit the influence of the Soviet Union 
within the region. It actively courted Gamal Abdel Nasser after he took control of 
Egypt during a coup in 1952 and supported his decision to nationalize the Suez 
Canal, although it opposed his efforts to refuse access to the waterway to Israeli 
shipping. For the Israelis, the President established the policy of supporting the 
small nation's right to exist within the boundaries of the Armistice Agreements of 
1949 and provided economic support to aid its burgeoning economy. 
Tensions in the region remained high during the first half of the 1950s, 
particularly between Israel and Egypt. Both sides took part in cross border raids 
and retaliations. During 1955 the cycle of violence accelerated. Nasser 
concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia to bring in large amounts of Soviet 
arms, including tanks and aircraft that would give the Egyptian military a vast 
numerical and technological (if not operational) advantage over the Israelis. 
Nasser's stature in the Arab world soared, a development that did not sit well 
with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. For the Israeli leader the time had 
come for a major showdown before the massive influx of Soviet arms tipped the 
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Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 303-304. 
Nasser provided the perfect pretext for Israeli action when on July 26, 
1956 he nationalized the Suez Canal, in spite of agreements signed with Britain 
and France concerning the Canal's operation mere weeks earlier. Israel had 
already received some political and military support from France, but Nasser's 
action brought Britain to Israel's side as well. On October 29, 1956, the second 
Arab-Israeli war broke out with an Israeli invasion of the Sinai. The plan was for 
the Israelis to feign an attack toward the Canal, which would allow Britain and 
France to occupy the waterway under the pretense of protecting it. The Israelis 
would then drive south and open the Straits of Tiran. The IDF performed 
brilliantly, but Britain and France were slow to move, and by the time they 
occupied the Canal Zone, all pretence of a defensive maneuver was gone. 
Despite being a smashing military success (at least on the part of the Israelis), 
politically the operation was a total disaster. The international community decried 
the action, and President Eisenhower, who had refused to denounce Nasser's 
nationalization of the Canal, called for immediate withdrawal, in spite of Egypt's 
recent alignment with the Soviets. The Israelis were forced to withdraw after the 
British and French caved to United States pressure. The prewar situation was 
restored, with the added precaution of inserting a United Nations Emergency 
Force to act as a buffer between the two nations.27 
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THE BUILD UP TO WAR 
The situation in the Middle East in the early 1960s was relatively stable. 
The cease fire agreement that ended the 1956 Suez incident had forcibly 
reestablished the prewar situation. Israel was forced to withdraw from the 
territories that it had captured due in large part to political and economic pressure 
applied by the Eisenhower administration, although it was saved the stigma of 
United Nations sanctions thanks to the efforts of the Senate Majority leader, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson. 
In general, the United States under President Kennedy tried to continue a 
broadly even-handed stance toward all nations of the Middle East. Several 
moderate Arab nations were recipients of United States military aid, including 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The young President worked toward reconciliation 
with Nasser, although relations with Egypt would fluctuate between mild 
contempt and outright disparagement, but in general the United States was able 
to use economic aid (totaling $880 million by the middle of 1963, mainly in the 
form of food shipments) to provide a counterweight to the growing influence of 
the Soviet Union on Nasser and prevent Egypt's total alignment with the 
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communist Superpower. At the same time, Israel was sold Hawk Missile 
systems in 1962, marking the first public sale of high tech United States arms to 
the Jewish state.2 9 
The election of Levi Eshkol as Israeli prime minister in 1963 helped to 
maintain the relative tranquility. Eshkol was a moderate, particularly in foreign 
affairs; he held "a belief in the possibility of Jewish-Arab coexistence."30 He felt 
that Israel could become a viable nation "within the borders of the armistice 
agreement."31 This, however, did not mean that he was weak on defense. 
Recognizing the importance of the IDF as a deterrent to Arab aggression, the 
new prime minister worked hard to gain increased support from the United 
States. He was fairly successful in the endeavor, attaining increased economic 
and military aid, including assurances from President Johnson and his 
administration that "It [Israel] can always count on the United States in an 
emergency. 
The new American administration attempted to maintain the balanced 
attitude in United States' relations within the region. It continued providing 
military and economic aid to both the Arab states and Israel. For the United 
States the Arab world was divided into two camps: those (primarily Saudi Arabia 
J
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and Jordan) that maintained good relations with the west and generally resisted 
Soviet influence into the region and were therefore deemed moderate and those 
(primarily Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) who resisted Western influence and expressed 
nationalist desires and accepted Soviet influence and material. These states 
were deemed radical. In general, Israel was treated on a par with the more 
radical Arab regimes, whereas the moderate Arabs received such offensive items 
as military aircraft and tanks.3 3 Arms sales to Israel were limited to munitions 
and parts. The United States refused the sale of modern armored units 
requested by the Israelis in 1964, based in large part on the conclusion that "the 
United States could not afford the losses in the Arab states" that such a sale 
would cause.3 4 The United States stressed that it was opposed to any Israeli 
moves to acquire a nuclear deterrent. 
Most of the Arab countries recognized the benefit of keeping tensions low, 
and several attempted to deal with the Israelis. King Hussein of Jordan initiated 
top secret meetings in 1963 in order to "exchange views on day-to-day security, 
facilitate practical cooperation, and explore the possibilities of a settlement."35 
Even the head of the Egyptian Army and close personal friend of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser, Abdel Hakim Amer, sought a secret meeting with 
Mossad chief Meir Amit in 1965, hoping to gain Israel's help in improving 
deteriorating relations with the United States in return for improved dealings 
33
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18 
between Egypt and Israel. Unfortunately, the more militant members of the 
Israeli government pressured Eshkol to refuse this opportunity, and the meeting 
never occurred.36 
The main point of tension in late 1966 and early 1967 was between Israel 
and Syria, and it was clearly a two-sided affair. Avi Shlaim describes a "Syrian 
Syndrome" held by many in the IDF leadership and the Israeli government 
stemming from past conflicts and intensified by the emergence of an extremist 
and radical Ba'athist regime in Syria in 1966, which led Israel to take a more 
militant stance towards its northern neighbor. Unofficial Israeli strategy promoted 
by the highest echelons of the IDF was to provoke a Syrian response by violating 
the demilitarized zone, then retaliate with increased fury in order to "compel the 
Syrian regime to desist from its hostile activities."37 For its part, Syria led efforts 
to divert the head waters of the river Jordan, thereby denying the Israelis access 
to much needed water and provoking several retaliatory strikes from Israel. In 
addition, Fatah raids into Israel from Syria combined with continual skirmishes in 
the demilitarized zone steadily increased anxieties between the two countries. 
On April 7, 1967, the Syrian shelling of an Israeli tractor that had entered 
the demilitarized zone rapidly escalated into full blown air combat, resulting in the 
downing of six Syrian MiGs and swiftly increasing tensions, and setting the stage 
for the Middle East crisis that would engulf the region the following month. 
The situation remained tense during early May. Relatively minor incidents 
along the northern border brought increasing Israeli threats of retaliation. 
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Nasser, whose standing among the Arab states had been failing and who was 
under increasing Arab pressure to stand up to the Israelis, used this explosive 
situation as evidence to support a Soviet warning that the Jewish state was 
preparing a major invasion of Syria. If this were true (there is no proof that it 
was), Egypt was bound by treaties and agreements that called for action on its 
part. Nasser followed through on the threats he had been making to remilitarize 
the Sinai. Moving the Egyptian army onto the peninsula was an unexpected 
move, but it raised little real concern in the United States or Israel. 
The United States believed that Nasser was trying to improve his 
diminishing stature in the Arab world through saber rattling and propaganda. 
Israeli intelligence confirmed these beliefs. Levi Eshkol, likewise, believed that 
the Israeli military could crush the Arab nations with ease; however, the situation 
made for excellent political fodder to attempt to increase global support, 
particularly from the United States. The Prime Minister had warned, "We are 
surrounded by a serious encirclement of hostility and that which doesn't succeed 
today could well succeed tomorrow or the day after."38 
In Washington, the Johnson administration continued to monitor the 
situation with little concern. After all, Nasser had acted similarly in 1960 in an 
attempt to relieve Arab pressure to act against the Israelis.39 However, the 
situation took a nasty turn on May 16, when Nasser sent a letter to the 
commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, General Rikhye, requesting 
the evacuation of United Nations forces, and moved the Egyptian army deeper 
3 8
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20 
into the Sinai.4 0 The letter was urgently forwarded to Secretary General U Thant, 
who promptly ordered withdrawal. By May 19 the UNEF troops began to pull out, 
leaving the two adversaries face to face for the first time in ten years. 
As soon as Nasser's request to remove the United Nations' forces 
became known, the Israelis began to seek assurances that President Johnson 
would hold to the guarantees of Israel's existence and security that had been 
made by the various administrations over the years. On May 18, Prime Minister 
Eshkol responded to a telegram that Johnson had sent him several days earlier. 
He was concerned about the lack of comment in the President's telegram to the 
"specific American commitment so often reiterated to us between May 1961 and 
August 1966." To the Prime Minister, the escalation of the situation had created 
an "urgent need to reaffirm the American commitment to Israel's security with 
view to its implementation should the need arise."41 Johnson was unable and 
unwilling to give the Israelis his public support at this time, since he wanted to be 
completely clear as to what, exactly, these promises would guarantee. As the 
United Nations' forces continued to evacuate their positions, the President was 
aware that the United States had previously committed, "(a) to prevent Israel 
from being destroyed and (b) to stop aggression - - either through the UN or on 
our own."4 2 Clearly there was a moral, if not material, requirement on the part of 
the United States to support and protect Israel. For now, however, the President 
and his administration decided to wait and see how the situation developed. 
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Unfortunately, it only got worse. On May 22, Nasser announced that he 
was closing the Straits of Tiran, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, to Israeli 
shipping. Until this action, the view of the Johnson administration was that "all 
Nasser wanted was a limited propaganda victory."43 The remilitarization of the 
Sinai had been mildly alarming and the request for the removal of UNEF troops 
seemed foolhardy, but neither was a violation of law nor a cause for war. 
However, the closing of the Straits of Tiran had long been considered an act of 
war by both the Israelis and the United States. According to American policy "the 
Gulf [of Aqaba] comprehends international waters and ... no nation has the right 
to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits [of 
Tiran]." Should these rights be denied, the United States was, "prepared to 
exercise the right of free and innocent passage."44 Pressure grew on the 
administration to fulfill its commitment to aid Israel. Instead, it stalled, choosing 
to stress that "Israel would not be alone unless it chooses to go alone."45 
War seemed increasingly likely. This put the United States in a difficult 
position, since any action it took would seriously damage relations in the Middle 
East. As stated by the former ambassador to Egypt, Lucius Battle, who had 
been recently appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, 
"whatever we do we are in trouble. If we fail to stand by Israel, the radical Arabs 
will paint us as a paper tiger. If we stand by Israel, we will damage ourselves 
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seriously with all the Arabs."46 The President wanted to assist Israel in her plight, 
but the escalation of the Vietnam conflict and Cold War commitments in Europe 
made it practically impossible to commit the military to the potential of a new 
crisis. In addition, the growing outcry against the war in South East Asia made 
the prospect appear extremely tenuous politically, at least to the administration 
which chose to ignore the growing public and congressional support for Israel in 
the United States. For many it made more sense to support Israel, who held 
similar ideological and political aspirations than to support the South Vietnamese, 
whose commitment to democracy and freedom were suspect at best. There 
appeared to be some time to maneuver: intelligence reports as late as May 26 
indicated that the situation on the Israeli Egyptian border appeared static and 
there was no "military reason why we should make any declaration or any military 
moves now."47 
The President and his advisors saw in the closure of the Straits of Tiran an 
opportunity to relieve tensions by forcing Nasser's hand. They asked the Israelis 
to delay any action as long as possible in order to let the United States try to 
pressure Nasser to reopen the Straits. This was to be done by sending a multi­
national flotilla through the straits. Although designed to be a challenge to the 
legal aspects of Nasser's closure of the waterway, the effort, dubbed the Red 
Sea Regatta, was perceived by many, including all Arab governments, as clear 
support for Israel. The administration hoped that Nasser would back down, but 
he did not, and even moderate Arab governments felt the United States was 
bs."46
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"seriously risking hostility of the entire Arab world and complete loss of influence 
in the area for the indefinite future by the appearance it has given to Arabs of 
identifying itself with Israel over the Tiran Straits and other related issues."48 
International support for the effort was extremely weak as well. Despite 
contacting more than eighty countries, the administration could only secure firm 
support from three, one of them Israel.49 The plan was virtually dead by the 
beginning of June. 
The administration had struggled since the beginning of the crisis to 
maintain the policy of even-handedness that had long been the emphasis of the 
United States' relations with the region. Johnson stressed this point in a public 
statement made on May 23. The President said: 
To the leaders of all nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three 
American Presidents have said before me - that the United States is firmly 
committed to the support of political independence and territorial integrity 
of all nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression 
by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine.50 
In trying to walk this political tightrope, the administration was unable to follow 
through on Presidential commitments made to the Israelis while at the same time 
honoring its relations with the moderate Arab regimes in the region. It became 
increasingly clear that in its actions, particularly in its position on the Straits of 
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and Israel but with Israel alone against all the Arabs."51 This choice was made 
without overt statements of support or military adjustments that could have 
provided the Israelis with political assurances to prevent a preemptive strike. 
The administration informed the Israelis that presidential commitments without 
the support of the public and Congress meant little; the President and the Israelis 
both knew that public support for Israel in the United States was strong and 
growing stronger every day. Congressional leaders had stressed that "The clear 
majority sentiment in the House of Representatives is pro-Israel. They feel Israel 
is being 'pushed around' by Nasser."52 Despite this, the administration would not 
provide the Israelis with a public or private commitment, instead pressing them 
hard to delay any preemptive military action. This could have been disastrous, 
as the Arab forces used that time to prepare defenses, reinforce units, and 
solidify Arab support for the actions of Egypt, including the consolidation of 
Jordanian forces under Egyptian command in an agreement signed on May 31st, 
thus potentially undermining one of the key advantages the IDF held against its 
Arab opponents: Arab factionalism. Moreover, the administration essentially 
informed the Israelis that even if the diplomatic effort failed (and it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that it would), there would be no support from the United 
States if the Israelis initiated the shooting. The Israelis were supposed to sit in 
an elevated state of readiness, stretching their economy to its limit, while the 
Arabs strengthened their position. In the view of Israel, this would only allow a 
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hardening of the situation into the status quo and a rewarding of the Arabs for 
bellicose saber rattling and idle threats, further detracting from Israel's security. 
Clearly the United States was in no position to prevent a disaster for the 
Jewish state if the IDF struggled against the combined forces of the Arab world; 
the Sixth Fleet, the primary United States military asset in the area, had not even 
been moved closer to the crisis zone, and the small number of ground troops 
available remained in Italy, three days away.5 3 But if the IDF did well, the United 
States might well forfeit its credibility and influence with the Israelis. All the 
administration could do was to wait and see and begin planning to "produce 
minimal damage to the United States' position in the world and to our position in 












INABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE VICTORS 
The first reports that major fighting had broken out on the Israeli-Egyptian 
border reached the White House situation room at 2:38 on the morning of June 
5.5 5 Clear information on the direction of the combat was slow to arrive. The 
Arab countries were broadcasting messages declaring that overwhelming 
success on the battlefield was at hand, but as the morning wore on the situation 
became more confused. The Israelis informed the administration that they had 
responded to an Egyptian armored assault, while the Arab nations were reporting 
that Israel had opened hostilities without provocation. The White House worked 
to ascertain the facts. By the end of the first day, the reports were fairly certain 
that, first, the conflict resulted from an Israeli pre-emptive strike and, second, that 
it had been very successful. Nasser began to call for his Arab allies to initiate 
action, while intelligence reports indicated that five UAR airfields were out of 
commission, and the IDF was driving hard against the Egyptian Army in the 
Sinai.5 6 Later that night, around 7:00, upon seeing a picture of himself with the 
Middle East Crisis timeline, Middle East Crisis box 17, NSC Histories, National Security File, LBJ 
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Secretaries of State and Defense on the cover of the Washington Evening Star, 
the President remarked, "There's a picture of a sad man.'"5 7 
Johnson may have been saddened by the fact that he had been unable to 
prevent bloodshed, but he certainly could not have been dismayed at the 
direction the war was taking and the clear effect it would have on the political 
situation of the United States. There would be no need to explain how the United 
States was unprepared to aid the Jewish state as it foundered under an Arab 
assault. Having sided with the Israelis during the build-up to the war, the 
administration continued this tactic. For the White House, the deciding factor in 
their attempts to end the fighting was, "how well the Israelis do - - or don't do - -
on the ground."58 The administration saw an opportunity in the one-sided affair. 
If the Israelis could take enough land before the United Nations Security Council 
could agree upon an end to the fighting, the "de facto situation on the ground" 
could be used to "negotiate not a return to armistice lines but a definitive peace in 
the Middle East."59 It was clear that the 1957 cease fire arrangements were 
wholly incapable of preventing the cycle of violence that might well destroy the 
Middle East and continually threaten global security. A new situation was 
needed, and the apparently overwhelming Israeli victory that was developing on 
the battlefield would allow the United States to seize the opportunity to create a 
new era for the region. 
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As the second day of fighting began, Cairo radio reported that United 
States naval forces and aircraft had provided direct assistance to the IDF during 
the opening stages of the War.6 0 Of course, these accusations were fabricated, 
and the White House worked diligently to ensure that the "Big Lie"6 1 was 
recognized as such. But the damage had been done in the Arab world, and the 
oil-producing countries proclaimed their intention to halt the sale of oil to any 
nation that had been involved in the fighting in support of Israel. Enormous 
demonstrations were held throughout the Arab world against United States 
embassies and facilities. Any remaining influence America had retained with the 
Arabs during the month of May (and it wasn't much) quickly evaporated. 
Despite these developments, the superpowers were able to orchestrate an 
agreement on a simple cease-fire. By 4:30pm on June 6, the United Nations 
Security Council had passed a resolution calling for a cease fire, which was 
intended as a first step.6 2 The Israelis accepted the cease fire, as did the 
Jordanians, but Egypt, Syria, and Iraq vehemently rejected the proposal because 
it did not require unconditional withdrawal.63 
In his announcement of the cease fire declaration, the President 
announced the administration's vision of developing a meaningful peace in the 
region. He proclaimed that the action represented a "very hopeful path away 
from danger in the Middle East" and that it was a "first step toward...a new time 
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29 
of settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East. It is toward 
this end that we will now strive."64 With this goal in mind, the President and his 
advisors felt that it was necessary to establish a separate group that would bring 
the "most competent people in and outside [the administration]...to determine 
what [the] problems are and what needs to be done."6 5 He brought in former 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to head this new Special Committee 
of the National Security Council. 
From its first meeting, the discussions of the Special Committee reflected 
the new foreign policy direction that had developed during the prewar period and 
had hardened as the war progressed. Its members immediately recognized that 
due to the administration's unwillingness to reassure the Israelis and offer any 
strong assistance, the United States' relationship with Israel had changed. The 
stellar performance of the IDF had saved the White House from the political 
disaster that would have resulted if the Israelis had struggled, and the United 
States could not provide assistance, which they were in no position to provide. It 
would not have taken the annihilation of the IDF and Israel to bring about 
disgrace for the United States. If the fighting had been slightly more even, and 
had caused the war to drag on for an extended period of time, the United States 
would have been in an even worse predicament. Fortunately for the 
administration, these eventualities did not develop, but one thing was sure: the 
Israelis had saved the administration on the political battlefield. There would be 
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no executive pressure on the Jewish state to yield its gains as had occurred 
during the Suez Crisis more than ten years earlier; the United States would not 
be able to force the Israelis to "accept a puny settlement."66 Having all but 
destroyed its standing among the Arabs, and lost much of its credibility as a 
defender of Israel, the administration determined that the United States would 
have to become "'attorneys for Israel'" in order to improve their standing with the 
victorious nation, now their primary ally in the region.67 
Resistance to the new alignment with Israel came from the State 
Department, which expressed the need for the administration to stay true to pre­
war declarations like the one made on May 23 that the United States supported 
territorial integrity. The administration, having determined that withdrawal without 
some sort of peace was out of the question, informed the State Department that 
"Old boundaries cannot be restored."68 For the White House, the only direction 
that would work and bore any chance of leading to peace was "Linking 
withdrawal to [a] peace settlement."69 It seemed obvious to the administration 
that the ground being gained by the IDF could be used as a bargaining chip to 
coerce the Arabs into easing relations with their Jewish neighbor; this would have 
the added bonus of rewarding the Israelis for preventing a political catastrophe. 
Even as the war still raged, the administration, mainly in the forum of the 




 Memorandum for the Record, 6/7/67, #55, Files of the Special Committee of the National Security 
Council box 1, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
6 8
 Memo from Bromely Smith to President, 6/11/67, Middle East Crisis box 18, NSC Histories, National 
Security File, LBJ Library. 
6 9
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/7/67, #52, Files of the Special Committee of the National 




  l, 
'' l'"  









67  ,   
 
68 1  
69   
  
31 
The Situation in the Near East: Statement by the President, as Read for Radio and Television, 5/23/67, 
#63, Middle East Crisis box 17, NSC Histories, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
7 1
 Memorandum for the Record, 6/7/67, #55, Files of the Special Committee of the National Security 
Council box 1, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
that would result in the President's Five Great Principles of Peace. Key 
questions arose over the prewar commitment to territorial integrity and avoidance 
of hostilities. Having claimed that they were "firmly committed to the support of 
political independence and territorial integrity of all nations of that area" and that 
"The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area," how 
could they now stand by the nation that had fired the first shot in their attempts to 
hold on to lands they were still acquiring? 7 0 
The question of who fired the first shot was a matter of perspective. 
Clearly the Israelis had struck first, but the administration argued that the Soviets 
and the Arabs had created a situation that spun out of control, and the Israelis 
had little choice but to act preemptively. The Israelis had laid out their thinking 
during the build-up to the war, and the White House understood their position. 
The Special Committee determined that if the United States had been put in a 
similar position, it would probably have acted in the same manner.71 In the eyes 
of the Johnson administration, the question of who fired the first shot was moot, 
since both parties were at fault in bringing about the crisis. 
Territorial integrity was a different question altogether. The sheer scope of 
the lands conquered made the situation difficult. When the war finally ended on 
June 11, the Israelis were in possession of nearly 42,000 additional square miles 
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entire West Bank, including the Old City of Jerusalem.72 As Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara noted shortly after the fighting ended, the United States was 
"in a heck of a jam on territorial integrity."73 
There was some feeling that the White House would have to accept 
responsibility for its past statements and that the Israelis would have to return 
some land in order to aid the peace process.74 But the Israelis were in a position 
of power and had already indicated that they would not withdraw without the 
recognition from the Arab states of its right to exist and a plan that would 
guarantee security.75 The White House's hands were tied; having failed the 
Israelis prior to the war, the amount of pressure it could bring to bear to achieve a 
relaxation of their position was very limited. 
The White House could possibly use the Israeli need to replenish its 
arsenal to bring about concessions, but with the damaged relations between the 
United States and all the Arab states, Israel was now the United States' main 
political and military ally in the region. The United States had been one of the 
first nations to recognize the Jewish State in 1948, and although it had been 
generally able to maintain friendly relationships with many nations of the region, 
public support for Israel had only grown stronger during the war.7 6 There was a 
clear need for the United States Government to aid the Israelis with their security 
needs, and arms could not be used as bargaining point. 
7 2
 Oren, 6 Days of War, 307. 
7 3
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/12/67, #38, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
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Yet the United States did enjoy new leverage with Israel, who had "For 20 
years...sought a special relationship...with us [the United States]."77 Finally 
being in that long desired position, the Israelis would not want to relinquish it 
lightly, especially given the generally pro-Arab sentiment in the United Nations. 
Resolutions were already being put forward in the Security Council by the 
Soviets calling not only for a return to the armistice lines but also for strong 
condemnation of Israel as the aggressor, which would damage the standing of 
Israel throughout the world. In this precarious circumstance, Israel would need 
the support of the United States.78 
But the Johnson administration had to tread carefully as well. The United 
States needed the Israelis to help defend their interests in the region, particularly 
given its strained relationship with the Arabs. If the Israelis were unwilling to 
yield any newly acquired territories, the United States would have to act against 
Israel or be perceived as unprincipled in the Arab World. But if it abandoned the 
Israelis, the United States would be viewed as a weak ally who was unwilling to 
stand up for a friend in need. The Soviets would certainly use this situation to 
improve its position with the Arab nations and around the globe. Additionally, the 
administration's standing on the domestic front, already being challenged due to 
its position on Vietnam, would be further damaged given the enormous public 
and congressional support for Israel; the prospects for achieving any future 
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Security File, LBJ Library. 
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 Presidential Remarks: Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, 6/19/67, Statement Box 241, LBJ 
Library. 
political victories would be extremely bleak and the President's entire foreign 
policy program would be called into question. 
The Special Committee dedicated much of its discussion to the issue of 
territorial integrity and troop withdrawal. It was under strong pressure from 
moderate Arabs to "Ensure that she [Israel] is unable to realize any gain as a 
result of this aggression."79 By supporting a policy of no withdrawal without 
peace the committee feared that it would "create a revanchism for the rest of the 
20t h century." But the United States' position was too weak to bring about any 
other conclusion. In the end, the administration would designate territorial 
integrity and political independence as the last of its Five Principles, but would tie 
that support to the establishment of peace in the region, stating: 
Certainly troops must be withdrawn, but there must also be recognized 
rights of national life - - progress in solving the refugee problem - -
freedom of innocent passage - - limitation of the arms race - - and the 
respect for political independence and territorial integrity.80 
By linking troop withdrawal and territorial integrity to a peace plan, the 
administration placed its support firmly behind the Israelis, further damaging its 
relations with the Arab world and decreasing the prospect of the permanent 
peace it sought to achieve. 
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UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE DEFEATED 
The United States' position with Israel was not the only relationship that 
had been greatly altered during the Middle East Crisis. Relations with the Arab 
world had deteriorated due to the appearance of total support for Israel as 
expressed in the United States' attempt to challenge the closure of the Straits of 
Tiran. This situation grew worse during the war, as Egypt and several other 
nations broke off relations with the United States, citing allegations of collusion 
with the IDF during the initial stages of the war. As the administration sought to 
develop its new postwar position, this lack of communication with the Arab world, 
particularly with Egypt, would lead to the development of a one-sided policy as 
stated in the Five Great Principles of Peace. 
As the administration sought to develop a plan that would lead to a stable 
peace in the region, it failed to make any attempt to communicate with the most 
important Arab player that would have to agree to a peace, namely Egypt. In the 
Special Committee, initial discussions focused on the administration's anger with 
Nasser. As it became clear that the Egyptian Army was enduring a demoralizing 
defeat, the committee discussed its belief (and hope) that the Egyptian President 
might be ousted. It was clear that the Egyptian people were going to need aid 
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and economic rehabilitation, but as long as Nasser remained in control, United 
States movement on this front would have to wait.81 
The White House was quite upset with the Egyptian President for his 
actions in the period leading up to the war and the false accusations and 
subsequent dissolution of relations during the first days of combat. It was quickly 
established that the administration would be very careful not to make any moves 
toward Egypt that would improve Nasser's standing in the Arab world. This 
meant that there would be no communication and that "Nasser had some things 
to say and do" before the United States would talk to him. 8 2 The decision not to 
speak with Nasser made a comprehensive postwar settlement all the more 
difficult to achieve. 
Shortly after the war, the Egyptians sent an invitation to Ambassador at 
Large Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. to go to Cairo and meet with them. The 
administration determined that "now was not the time" to resume communication 
with Nasser.83 The Special Committee was concerned with the effect it would 
have on its relations with Israel as Lodge himself was considered to be a "red 
flag to Israelis."84 Additionally, the White House was clinging to the hope that 
Nasser would be overthrown and did not want to hinder that possibility.85 In fact, 
it would be over six years, long after the death of Nasser in September 1970 and 
8 1
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/7/67, #52, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
Security Council box 1, National Security File, LB J Library. 
8 2
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/8/67, #48, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
Security Council box 1, National Security File, LB J Library. 
8 3
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/13/67, #36, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
Security Council box 1, National Security File, LB J Library. 
8 4
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/14/67, #30, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
Security Council box 1, National Security File, LB J Library. 
8 5
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/13/67, #36, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
Security Council box 1, National Security File, LB J Library. 
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the conclusion of another Arab-Israeli war in 1973, before the United States and 
Egypt resumed their relationship. 
The administration's grudge against Nasser was certainly based on 
legitimate complaints. Nasser had been pivotal in the escalation of the crisis. He 
had also put about damaging lies about United States involvement in the fighting 
and broken off communications in an attempt to salvage his position in the Arab 
world. Additionally, he had walked away from the first cease fire proposal in an 
attempt to "preserve something of his position and leadership."86 But as the 
White House was shunning Egypt, it had no problem consulting with the 
Jordanians throughout the crisis. To be sure, Jordan had neither broken 
relations nor played as integral a role in the crisis as Egypt, but it had been 
compliant in the effort and had suffered devastating losses as a result. Before 
the war started, King Hussein had signed an agreement with Nasser placing his 
military under Egyptian command and authorizing troops from other Arab nations 
to be stationed in his country.87 Once the war began, he made statements 
supporting Nasser and shelled Israel. But to the White House, these infractions 
were minor due to the good relations Jordan had maintained with the United 
States before the crisis and Jordan's perceived importance in establishing peace. 
The White House briefly hoped that negotiations between Jordan and 
Israel might divide the Arab nations that were aligned against them and 
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eventually lead to peace.88 This was a peculiar assumption, given that 
recognition of Israel by Jordan would have drastically undermined King Hussein's 
political position within his own country, a fact the White House certainly 
understood. Regardless, they explored the possibility of a meeting between the 
two nations, but the two sides were unable to come to terms and the meeting 
never took place. 
Due to this focus on Jordan, whose relationship with the United States 
was damaged, but not destroyed, the administration was unable to draft a policy 
and a program for peace that stood any chance of being successful. They 
understood the general feeling of the Arab world against allowing Israel to 
"realize any gains as a result of this aggression."89 Egypt's reaction would 
certainly have been along those lines, but the issue was primarily between Israel 
and Egypt, not Israel and Jordan (or any other moderate, friendly Arab nation). 
By not even listening to or negotiating with the principal opponent in the conflict, 
the administration placed its support further behind the Israelis and formulated a 
policy that was based entirely on the concerns of the victors, totally disregarding 
those of the defeated. 
Additionally, by ignoring the Egyptians, the administration failed to 
capitalize on an opportunity to damage the Soviet Union's standing in the region. 
The Soviet Union's standing had been greatly damaged, like that of the United 
States and Israel, by its unwillingness to aid the Arabs once the fighting had 
8 8
 Memorandum for the President, 6/7/67, #53, Middle East Crisis box 18, NSC Histories, National 
Security File, LBJ Library. 
8 9
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88  ,  
89  / lO  
39 
y o
 Cable from Embassy Rabat, 6/8/67, #84a, Middle East Crisis box 18, NSC Histories, National Security 
File, LBJ Library. 
begun. To the Arabs, the Soviet failure had lowered their standing to the point 
where "Nasser and other Arab leaders" were "putting both governments in the 
same category."90 The door was open to the United States to dramatically 
improve its political situation in the Arab world, but the administration did not take 
advantage of the opportunity because of its anger against Nasser. Had they 
been willing to take the initiative and at least listen to Nasser, they could possibly 









A LACK OF CONVICTION IN PROPOSING AN EFFECTIVE 
ARMS LIMITATION POLICY 
The fourth point of the Five Great Principles of Peace was the need to limit 
the arms race that had enveloped the region over the preceding decade. 
Johnson said: 
The United States, for its part, will use every resource of diplomacy, and 
every counsel of reason and prudence, to find a better course. As a 
beginning, we propose that the United Nations should call upon its 
members to report all shipments of military arms to the area.91 
This call demonstrated a severe lack of conviction and realistic dedication to the 
admirable goal of limiting arms. A policy of simply reporting arms transfers stood 
little chance of actually reducing the influx of arms to the region, let alone of 
preventing the resumption of the arms race. Once it became clear that the plan 
would receive little support in the international community, the administration 
exacerbated its failure by not reporting its own arms sales, calling into question 
its desire to attain this admirable goal. 
As the Middle East crisis developed, it became clear that one of the major 
issues for the region was the influx of arms that had allowed the crisis to take on 
the scale it had. It was deemed "desirable urgently to raise the problem of 
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limiting future supply of arms to the Arab states and Israel."92 To this end, three 
possible courses of action were established. The first option was a negotiated 
arms limitation device as part of a general settlement for peace in the Middle 
East. This option was deemed to be "the least feasible," as it would require the 
initiation of peace negotiations between the parties, a possibility that seemed 
increasingly remote.9 3 
Another option would be to establish an agreement between the primary 
suppliers of military hardware to limit the amount and type of weapons that could 
be sold to the nations of the region. Although this option would certainly have 
helped limit the arms race, it would have been extremely difficult to orchestrate 
because it "smacks of great power domination...and these countries themselves 
will be sensitive to the reverberations of resentment from the Arab countries and 
Israel."94 
The final option would be to establish, through the United Nations, an 
international registry of future arms shipments to the area. As the least intrusive 
program, this choice would certainly provide the easiest way to gain agreement. 
However, as it would leave the actual choice on limiting arms to the suppliers 
without any commitment to reduction, it was "less certain to be effective."95 Upon 
review by the Special Committee, the administration decided that it would pursue 
this final course. 
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The administration's initial inquiries with the international community were 
less than positive. The Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, 
failed to find a third party to propose a resolution. He reported that "neutral 
parties [are] not eager to press arms registration."96 The possibility of directly 
sponsoring a proposal was discussed, but in the end the administration favored 
making a statement either in the United Nations or in another forum. Eventually, 
the arms registry proposal was presented in the Five Great Principles of Peace 
Speech. 
There were precedents for the attempt to establish an arms registry, all of 
them bad. It had been proposed several times since the Suez Crisis. President 
Eisenhower had vaguely proposed an attempt to limit the sale of arms to the 
region, as had several other nations, including the Soviets in 1957.9 7 An arms 
registry in the region was attempted several times, including a proposal in 1965 
from which the United States had abstained because it felt that, "divorced from 
other arms control measures, [it] would be ineffective."98 The very concept of a 
registry was suspect, having only had one effective attempt, and this dealt with 
the United Nations registry of satellites.99 The administration plainly recognized 
that an arms registry would probably not get approved; the administration itself 
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the "prospect for movement along this line is not good," the administration 
pushed on in the direction of an arms registry.1 0 0 
Once the proposal had been made, the administration pursued its plan 
with little success. Even the British were "surprised and unhappy with the 
proposal."101 The administration discussed the possibility of proceeding on a 
unilateral basis. This was determined to be too risky a venture due to the high 
probability of total failure in enticing the international community to join the effort. 
It would also put United States' allies on the spot, a position they would certainly 
resent. Finally, it would be perceived as an anti-Arab ploy to embarrass the 
Soviet Union, damaging the White House's global dealings with the 
Communists.102 The international arms registry idea was essentially dead by 
September, only two months after its initial proposal. 
Arms limitation to the Middle East was certainly a goal worth pursuing; the 
influx of arms to the region had evidently heightened tensions and had ensured 
that disagreements between Arabs and Israelis would have deadly 
consequences. The administration recognized this fact, but in its effort to rein in 
the arms race, it chose to pursue the easiest route despite the strong prospect of 
failure. If it had pursued a more worthy plan, such as an attempt to gain an 
agreement among the major arms suppliers, the result would probably have been 
the same, but the United States would have at least displayed a real desire to 
limit the supply of arms in the region and a deep commitment to peace. Instead 
1 0 0
 Status of Efforts to Curb the Influx of Arms to the Arab States and Israel, 6/14/67, #78, Files of the 
Special Committee of the National Security Council box 1, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
1 0 1
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it displayed a total lack of conviction for stopping the arms race by proposing 




REFUSAL TO DEAL WITH THOSE MOST AFFECTED 
BY THE CONFLICT 
Perhaps the biggest failure of the United States' new policy toward the 
Middle East that emerged after the Six Day War was the administration's refusal 
to include the Palestinians in their plan for peace. During his speech on June 19, 
President Johnson exclaimed that the United States was "ready to see any 
method tried, and we believe that none should be excluded altogether."103 Yet in 
the development of the Five Principles, his administration had already failed to 
take the open-minded step of viewing the Palestinians as a people rather than a 
group of Arab refugees. To be sure, "justice for the refugees" was delineated as 
the second principle, but that justice apparently did not include a voice in 
decisions concerning their own future.1 0 4 
During the development process the administration never discussed the 
Palestinians as a people, preferring to focus on them as refugees. In this, the 
United States was certainly not alone. Their closest Arab allies also viewed the 
Palestinians as refugees, and expressed great, if not entirely benevolent, 
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concern over their well being.1 0 5 On this front the administration claimed to 
beworking "for refugees and residents on both sides," including stressing to the 
Israelis the importance of encouraging the residents of the region to remain and 
approval of continued funding and support for the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.1 0 6 
When the administration was presented with the prospect of an Israeli 
attempt to work with the Palestinians to create a semiautonomous state, they 
balked at the idea. It was seen as an attempt to annex the West Bank from 
Jordan, a prospect that was determined to be ripe with "political danger," that 
would "make general Arab-Israeli peace more difficult to imagine, and would 
create another Arab grievance."107 The United States was too focused on making 
sure that King Hussein remained in control and on the microscopic prospects of a 
Jordanian-Israeli peace deal to even explore the possibility. 
The administration underestimated the importance of the Palestinian 
issue. Led by Yasser Arrafat and the PLO, a vision of Palestinian nationalism 
was quickly taking hold. But Johnson "encouraged Israel to negotiate with King 
Hussein" and refused to view the situation as anything other than a refugee 
problem which was clearly dealt with in United Nations resolution 194 of 1948.1 0 8 
1 0 5
 Cable from Embassy Rabat, 6/8/67, #84a, Middle East Crisis box 18, NSC Histories, National Security 
File, LBJ Library and King Faisal's reply, Jidda 5272, 6/12/67, #10a, Middle East Crisis box 18, NSC 
Histories, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
1 0 6
 NSC Special Committee meeting notes, 6/14/67, #30, Files of the Special Committee of the National 
Security Council box 1, National Security File, LBJ Library and State Department Memo to Amman, 
6/16/67, #43c, Files of the Special Committee of the National Security Council box 2, National Security 
File, LBJ Library. 
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It is unfortunate that Johnson would cling to a resolution that had not worked for 
twenty years. The Israelis had begun negotiations with the local Palestinian 
leadership with promising results.1 0 9 This avenue probably represented 
Johnson's best hope for attaining a durable peace. Unfortunately, without a 
powerful mediator, a role the United States could have assumed, the discussions 
stalled and the brief opportunity was gone. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Despite denials that the United States had botched its handling of the 
situation, Johnson's Five Principles demonstrate that the President and his 
administration had realized that the Israelis had prevented a political crisis that 
would undoubtedly have called the President's entire foreign policy agenda into 
question. Israel's growing importance as an American ally was highlighted by 
Nasser's unfounded accusations that the United States had physically intervened 
in the conflict and the subsequent severing of diplomatic relations by the Arab 
nations. Johnson was also clearly influenced by the astronomical support for 
Israel in the United States; of 17,445 letters sent to the White House in the first 
days of the war, 96% supported Israel.1 1 0 Israel was now America's closest friend 
in the region, and for the administration, it would not have been wise to apply too 
much pressure on them for major concessions. 
There was an obvious disconnect between Israeli desires and those of the 
United States. Although it understood Israel's new importance, the Johnson 
administration failed to recognize the Israelis' determination to hold onto some of 
the occupied lands. The day after the war ended, Israeli forces destroyed the 
Maghrabi quarter of the Old City in front of the West Wall. 1 1 1 Within a week the 
u u
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Jerusalem city limits were rearranged, and several hundred Arabs had been 
moved from the city to ensure an Israeli majority.112 Citing the 1907 Hague 
convention (which had long been considered customary international law) and 
the Fourth Geneva Accord of 1949, the United States and the United Nations 
harshly criticized these measures but took no steps toward reversing them.1 1 3 In 
fact, these actions were not mentioned in Johnson's Five Great Principles 
speech, and Jerusalem was only mentioned briefly: "There must be adequate 
recognition of the special interests of the three great religions in the Holy places 
of Jerusalem."114 On 24 September 1967, Prime Minister Eshkol publicly 
proclaimed Israel's intentions to rebuild settlements in the Etzion block, an area 
that had been occupied by the Jordanians in the 1948 war. Johnson declared 
that this went against his Five Principles but again took no further action.1 1 5 
On 22 November 1967, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
adopted a British version of a previously proposed solution, called Resolution 
242. This resolution fell far short of a solid peace plan. It called for Israeli 
withdrawal, but gave no specifics on the timing or scope of the pullback and 
attempted to establish long-term peace treaties between the Arabs and the 
Israelis, but gave no time line for their implementation.116 In addition, the 
Refugee problem was barely mentioned. The resolution became the basis for 
American policy and the "cornerstone of all future peace efforts in the middle 
1 1 2
 David Neff, "Jerusalem in U.S. Policy," Journal of Palestine Studies 23, (1993): 21. 
1 1 3
 Adam Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967," 
American Journal of International Law 84 (1990): 53. 
1 1 4
 Presidential Remarks: Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, 6/19/67, Statement Box 241, LBJ 
Library. 
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East down to the late 1990's" and to the present day, but it has failed to bring the 
two sides closer.1 1 7 The Arabs wanted withdrawal before negotiations and the 
Israelis wanted negotiations before withdrawal. 
The Johnson administration could merely talk about its hopes for a lasting 
peace. Even after Resolution 242 was passed, it exerted little pressure on Israel 
to conform to the decree. Instead, it was forced to sit by and watch as the 
Israelis began their settlement and deportation policies. Bogged down in 
Vietnam, the administration was unable to provide the assistance and military 
assurances that could have prevented the war and were not in a position to aid 
the Israelis had the fighting gone against them. When the IDF destroyed the 
Arab armies, the United States was saved the embarrassment of not being able 
to assist an ally. The entire situation in the Middle East had been altered: 
American relations with many of the Arab countries had been greatly damaged, 
and Israel became the United States' closest and strongest ally in the region. 
The administration's hands were tied. It could not apply the same intense 
pressure on Israel that Eisenhower had, due to the increased importance of the 
Jewish state as the prime defender of United States' interests in the region and 
fear of losing more influence to the Soviets in the Middle East. In addition, given 
the rapid rearmament of the Arab forces by the Soviets, the United States could 
not use military aid as a carrot to gain more concessions from the Israelis due to 
the strong public and congressional support for the Jewish state. The White 
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The administration also refused to have any contact with Egypt, the prime 
antagonist in the crisis. In so doing, it failed to acknowledge that there were two 
sides to the conflict and that two sides would have to be a party to the solution. 
Additionally, by isolating Nasser, the administration allowed the Soviets to 
resume the position of influence with Egypt. The Arabs made it clear that there 
was an opening for the United States to increase its influence. Unfortunately, the 
administration chose to act like an angry child and refused to have any contact. 
To make matters worse, the administration failed to stand up and pursue 
an effective arms limitation policy. Instead of proposing a bold plan that could 
have helped limit the influx of arms into the region (however improbable), the 
White House decided to take the easiest course, that it knew had little chance of 
getting approved, let alone of reducing arms. By taking this road, the 
administration merely paid the problem political lip-service and demonstrated 
their lack of commitment. 
Perhaps the only opportunity to attain a lasting peace would have been 
thorough support of Israel's brief attempts to deal with the Palestinians directly. 
Unfortunately, the President and his advisors failed to recognize the growing 
importance of the PLO and the Palestinian nationalist movement and preferred to 
deal with Jordan. If the administration had deemed that the PLO was not a 
viable representative for the Palestinians, they could have sought a more 
acceptable option. Instead, they ignored the Palestinians, choosing to see them 
merely as refugees, and thus denied them a political voice. 
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Presidential Remarks: Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, 6/19/67, Statement Box 241, LBJ 
Library. 
The Five Great Principles of Peace sought to establish a general 
understanding of the key issues required to bring about peace in the Middle East. 
In this the administration was fairly successful; the basic concepts of every 
nation's right to exist, an answer to the refugee situation, maritime rights, limiting 
the arms race and territorial integrity and political independence were noble 
ends, and the international reaction, particularly from western nations, was 
positive. But in its drafting, the administration ignored its own recognition that it 
was "a time not for malice but for magnanimity; not for propaganda but for 
patience; not for vituperation but for vision."1 1 8 In so doing, it failed to 
demonstrate the open mindedness and flexibility that were certainly required to 
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